The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; Pub. L. 107-110, enacted January 8, 2002) is broadly aimed at achieving student proficiency in reading and mathematics across all states and closing extant academic achievement gaps between identifiable subgroups of U.S. students. Crucially, the policy is grounded in the theory that establishing measurable student performance standards with consequences for schools will motivate the improvement of student achievement outcomes. NCLB relies on high-stakes testing of students to ensure that schools make adequate yearly progress (AYP) toward the goal of 100% student proficiency in these subjects by 2014. Test-driven external accountability policy under NCLB builds on the alleged success of firstgeneration accountability states such as Texas and North Carolina. Evidence for the effects of such pre-NCLB test-driven accountability policy on student achievement, however, was mixed and often contradictory (see Carnoy & Loeb, 2002; Grissmer & Flanagan, 1998; Haney, 2000; Ladd, 1999; Lee, 2008) . Furthermore, recent studies also yield mixed findings on post-NCLB academic progress, generating controversy over the policy's efficacy (see Center on Education Policy [CEP], 2007c; Dee & Jacob, 2009; Duffett, Farkas, & Loveless, 2008; Education Trust, 2006; Fuller, Gesicki, Kang, & Wright, 2006; Lee, 2006; Wong, Cook, & Steiner, 2009) .
Mixed evidence for the effects of NCLB on student achievement may be well understood from research design and methodological perspectives. First, previous studies often confounded policy effects by relying on data from states' own assessments as a tool of both NCLB intervention and evaluation at the same time. States tended to show more post-NCLB progress on their own high-stakes tests, although such progress did not always transfer to independent low-stakes tests such as the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP; Lee, 2010) . In addition, even when the NAEP instead of state assessments is used for policy evaluation, post-NCLB change may reflect a continuing trend that began before the policy was implemented. It remains to be rigorously examined whether and, if so, how and to what extent NAEP reading and mathematics average achievement and achievement gap trends are systematically related to state implementation of test-driven accountability policies before and after NCLB.
Second, research efforts to evaluate NCLB were thwarted by the complexity and variability of policy design and implementation in different states. Under NCLB, the existence of dual accountability systems and interactions between federal and state policies also complicates the analysis of post-NCLB achievement data. The mandatory nationwide implementation of NCLB essentially precludes analysis of further impacts of overall accountability systems by eliminating a comparison group of states without such policies (Hanushek & Raymond, 2004) . Nevertheless, some previous studies attempted to capitalize on interstate pre-NCLB accountability policy variations (Dee & Jacob, 2009; Lee, 2006) . This research design treats first-generation accountability states as a comparison group and second-generation accountability states as a treatment group under NCLB. One major problem with this simple design, however, is the assumption that all states are subject to the same dosage of accountability policy treatment under NCLB. The earlier studies also had limitations in that it could take several years for a new federal policy to produce an effect and also that the effect, if any, could be uneven between states, subjects, and subgroups within states as a function of their preexisting differences as well as policy treatment.
In light of these concerns, this study employs a new approach to the evaluation of NCLB with regard to its impact vis-à-vis excellence and equity policy goals. Our approach involves a comparative interrupted time-series design, with an enriched multilevel analysis of both intrastate and interstate variations in NAEP achievement outcomes before as well as after NCLB. The model incorporates state capacity and policy implementation factors beyond the adoption of high-stakes testing, and time-varying school resource effects into achievement trends. In addition, this study addresses potential threats to the internal validity of quasi-experimental research on the impact of NCLB by using enhanced statistical control for selection biases and regression to the mean through inverse probability treatment weighting and latent variable regression techniques. Our study also extends prior work by examining states' progress toward narrowing academic achievement gaps (i.e., those between students in the 10th/25th and 90th/75th percentiles) as well as racial/ethnic and socioeconomic achievement gaps and by explaining the gap trends in the broader, longer term context of state capacity and endowment irrespective of federal policy.
Given current policy goals and intervention targets, this study tests the hypothesis that NCLB promotes academic excellence and equity in reading and math across all states by both improving the average achievement of all students and narrowing the gap between disadvantaged, low-achieving and minority students and their counterparts. It also tests the hypotheses that states with stronger educational capacity in place to produce desired student outcomes and with more timely, intensive, and rigorous implementation of accountability policy under NCLB would experience a more positive impact.
Analytical Framework
The theory of action behind test-driven external accountability policy is deemed fatally simple (see Adams & Kirst, 1999; Benveniste, 1985; Elmore, 2002; Fuhrman, 1999; Newmann, King, & Rigdon, 1997; O'Day, 2002; Wise, 1979) . The logic of performance-driven accountability policy draws on rationalistic and behavioristic views of human behavior by positing that holding schools, teachers, and students accountable for academic performance, with incentives provided (i.e., rewards and sanctions), will inform, motivate, and reorient the behavior of schooling agents toward the goal. Over the years, states' policy approaches to accountability have switched from a primary emphasis on input guarantees to performance guarantees (Elmore & Fuhrman, 1995) . The advocates of input guarantees argue that every student must have equal access to highquality learning by specifying key inputs (e.g., per-pupil spending, class size, and teacher training) in the form of binding opportunity-to-learn (OTL) standards (O'Day & Smith, 1993 ). In contrast, the critics of OTL standards argue that holding schools and students accountable for performance creates incentives for schools to find out which practices work most effectively (Hanushek, 1997) . Although neither an input nor an output focus does not automatically lead to improvement in the distribution of student learning, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive, and combining them can be a more successful path (Bartman, 2002) . For example, lower class sizes and increased, more equitable funding in Texas have created a context in which the accountability system could increase academic excellence and equity (Grissmer, Flanagan, Kawata, & Williamson, 2000; Skrla, Scheurich, Johnson, & Koschoreck, 2004) .
If an analysis were to find a distinctive effect of NCLB, it could not, of course, be attributed to just one part of NCLB such as high-stakes testing or school accountability. Other policy initiatives under NCLB (e.g., teacher quality), and an initial influx of new federal funds, may have influenced the trends as well. Moreover, some states that had high-stakes test-driven accountability prior to NCLB continued their own policies along with NCLB, thus creating a dual accountability system. By the same token, the pre-NCLB period is not free of similar types of interventions (e.g., restructuring). Consequently, both pre-NCLB and post-NCLB policy factors should be considered.
Lawmakers did not intend that NCLB would supplant a state's preexisting accountability policy but rather that it would function as an add-on to enhance or augment state policy. States with strong accountability systems may be better positioned to embrace and implement NCLB reform policy since implementation theory predicts stronger implementation fidelity among agents/players who are accustomed to the intervention. No matter what real impact NCLB may have had on first-generation states, the primary target of NCLB may have very well been second-generation states-those states where testdriven external accountability was new. By this logic, states with no exposure to high-stakes testing prior to NCLB would be more likely to experience the effect of this new intervention by improving on their pre-NCLB achievement.
Previous studies on the impact of NCLB, including Lee (2006) and Dee and Jacob (2009) , attempted to address variation among states in their accountability policy history prior to NCLB. Specifically, states that did not have high-stakes accountability policies before NCLB and were exposed only to the influences of external accountability under NCLB are compared with states that were active in test-driven accountability policy prior to NCLB. Their analyses compare differences in both pre-and post-NCLB growth rates between these two groups of states to draw causal inferences about the impact of NCLB. Lee (2006) found that NCLB did not make a significant difference in improving reading and mathematics achievement or achievement gaps across the states.
1 In contrast, Dee and Jacob (2009) reported significantly positive effects in Grade 4 math.
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Both Lee (2006) and Dee and Jacob (2009) employed a comparative interrupted time-series research design for their analyses of NCLB accountability policy effects (see Design A in Figure 1 ). This design is based on the assumption that first-generation accountability states maintain the same accountability policy as before NCLB whereas second-generation accountability states adopted this same accountability policy only after NCLB. However, this design ignores the possibility that federal NCLB accountability policy has added its own features to what first-generation states had and also that second-generation states did not implement that policy as faithfully and expeditiously as did their first-generation counterparts. To address this implementation dimension and federalstate policy interactions, this study adds post-NCLB policy variables to the model in addition to just a pre-NCLB state policy variable (see Design B in Figure 1 ).
Regardless of whether or not students in highaccountability states averaged significantly greater post-NCLB gains on the NAEP than students in states with little or no pre-NCLB accountability measures in place, the reasons for the presence or absence of such an effect remain unclear. Previous studies found that states' policy approaches to school accountability vary in terms of their mix of pressure and support (Elmore & Fuhrman, 1995; Lee & Wong, 2004) . Similar patterns of interstate variations in accountability and capacity building efforts are likely to produce different results after NCLB. However, previous studies did not examine the mechanism through which high-stakes accountability policy might have affected student outcomes. This kind of black-box approach ignored variables that account for the relationship between state policy and student outcome variables. This study elaborates on Design B by examining critical factors that might influence the success of policy implementation, that is, fidelity, rigor, and capacity.
First, this study constructs a state fidelity of implementation variable as a predictor of policy outcomes. Not all states fully implemented NCLB, at least in the first several years after the law passed. One possible reason for interstate variation in post-NCLB progress is states' different implementation strategies (Lee, 2010) .
Given the tradition that much of educational policymaking has been historically left to the states, individual states were able to negotiate an implementation plan with the federal government and to take advantage of built-in flexibilities around standard-setting under NCLB (Marion et al., 2002; Mills, 2008). 3 This study also constructs a state rigor of performance standards measure as another key dimension of NCLB accountability. The percentage of schools that did not meet performance targets and thus received interventions depended not only on how well the schools perform but also on how rigorous the performance standards are (Lee, 2010) . Recent studies of NCLB policy interventions for schools identified as "needing improvement" (a euphemism for failure) reveal problems. For example, a RAND/AIR study (Zimmer, Gill, Razquin, Booker, & Lockwood, 2007) shows very limited participation in supplemental education services (24%-28% in elementary and <5% in Note. X 1 = pre-NCLB state accountability policy; X 2 = NCLB federal accountability policy; X 1 + X 2 = mix of federal and state accountability policies under NCLB; X 1 + X 2 = delayed or watered-down version of X 1 + X 2 ; O = student reading and math achievement average and gap measures.
high school) and school choice (<1%) and very small and no effects of supplementary education services and school choice, respectively, on student achievement. As last resorts, corrective action and restructuring also appear to have been either underused or ineffective (CEP, 2008) . 4 However, few Title I schools undergoing restructuring even experienced any of the listed interventions (Mathis, 2009) .
Last, the study adds measures of states' capacity for district/school support. Previous studies showed that test-driven accountability policies imposed changes in schools with little to no support over the long haul and that this unfunded mandate has shortchanged schools (Kim & Sunderman, 2004; Linn, 2003; Porter & Chester, 2002) . Although NCLB provides a federal mandate for states to develop statewide systems of support intended to build the capacity of underperforming districts and schools, this new expectation for an enhanced role of state education agencies in school improvement has faced serious challenges due to their own fiscal, administrative, and technical capacity limitations (CEP, 2007b; McClure, 2005; Rhim, Hassel, & Redding, 2008) . Therefore, we consider that it is critical to measure statewide endowment or capacity from a multilevel education system perspective, incorporating not only state agency-level capacity measures such as funding and data system building for district/school support but also school/classroomlevel educational endowment measures such as teacher quality and class size. The effects of these key school resources on academic achievement have been well demonstrated (see Ferguson, 1991; Finn & Achilles, 1990; Greenwald, Hedges, & Laine, 1996; Grissmer et al., 2000; Lee & Barro, 1998) . However, a previous study also found that state activism in high-stakes school accountability policy did not usually lead to systemic changes in the distributions of key school resources (Lee & Wong, 2004) . The same problem could recur when states implement high-stakes accountability policy under NCLB in lieu of or by means of capacity building and investment.
Method
This study employs a comparative interrupted time-series design to explore the impact of the NCLB policy on student achievement outcomes and achievement gaps in reading and mathematics. The aggregate national trends may obscure variations among states in terms of both the nature and extent of NCLB policy impact. The study uses NAEP state-level aggregate fourth-and eighth-grade public school students' achievement results in these subjects during the 1990-2009 period. The "interrupted" time-series aspect of this study's design involves division of the NAEP trend period into pre- NCLB (1990 ) and post-NCLB (2003 -2009 periods. It estimates post-NCLB changes in average achievement relative to pre-NCLB trends among fourth and eighth graders. The "comparative" aspect of the study design involves comparison of states varying in terms of their educational capacity and highstakes accountability policy history prior to NCLB as well as the fidelity and rigor of their NCLB policy implementation.
There can be several different possible trajectories concerning the post-NCLB change of state average achievement. For each of the three potential post-NCLB growth patterns, changes may be observed in terms of growth rate (slope) and/or achievement status (level). When NCLB has a significant positive effect, the performance trajectory will shift upward with a marked increase in achievement level and/or growth rate. When NCLB has a significant negative effect, the performance trajectory will shift downward with a marked decrease in the growth rate and/or level. When NCLB has no effect at all, we expect no change in the level and slope such that pre-and post-NCLB growth patterns remain the same.
Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) was used to track individual states' patterns of academic growth and to examine interstate variations (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002 ) were assumed to vary randomly among states. The model postulates discontinuities in both slope and level; it hypothesizes that both the growth rate and level change after NCLB. When both level and slope increase together, we expect sustained positive gain after NCLB such that the post-NCLB growth rate is significantly greater than the pre-NCLB growth rate and the gains are not temporary.
The Level 1 model also includes time-varying covariates. Recognizing that demographic changes between cohort groups may influence student achievement trends, we account for the percentages of minority (i.e., Black and Hispanic) and poor (i.e., eligible for free or reduced-price lunch) students. Furthermore, the Level 1 model includes teacher salary (as proxy for teacher experience and quality) and pupil-teacher ratio (as proxy for class size) to examine the effects of key school resources on achievement outcomes over time among sequential cohorts. Per pupil expenditures, global measures of school resources, are highly correlated with both the teacher salary and pupil-teacher ratio variables. Moreover, since teacher salary and pupil-teacher ratio serve as key determinants of instructional spending per pupil, we used those two specific measures of school resources for elementary and secondary education.
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Our supplementary trend analyses of these time-varying covariates as dependent variables showed significant growth in percentage minority/ poverty students both before and after NCLB. Pupil-teacher ratio and teacher salary showed different trends: Pupil-teacher ratio decreased incrementally throughout the 1990-2009 period, whereas real teacher salary remained largely unchanged. There were substantial variations among states in the trend of increases in school resources (associated with increases in achievement) as well as increases in the poor, minority population (with decreases in achievement) throughout the entire period. These forces may have worked together to influence state achievement trends, independent of NCLB. At Level 2 (state level), not only pre-NCLB state accountability policy but also variables that tap into post-NCLB state policy activities are used to explain interstate variations in post-NCLB changes to state achievement trends; they include fidelity of NCLB implementation, rigor of standards, data tracking capacity, and funding capacity for schools in need of improvement (SINI; see Appendices B and C). The fidelity variable measures how faithfully and quickly states complied with key NCLB federal requirements in place, whereas the rigor variable captures the level of states' own performance standard as measured by the discrepancy between NAEP and state assessment results, which captures the scale of intervention. State education agency capacity variables include measures of building a longitudinal student achievement data tracking system and funding for SINI schools. The effect sizes are reported based on studentlevel standard deviations (σ) of achievement in 2003.
Correlations among the Level 2 state variables show a weak to moderate degree of interrelationships but no indication of multicollinearity problems. The fidelity of states' NCLB policy implementation was positively associated with the intensity of their pre-NCLB high-stakes accountability policy (r = .38) and slightly negatively associated with the rigor of performance standards (r = -.20 for reading; r = -.25 for math). This suggests that the first-generation accountability states were more likely to comply with NCLB mandates but at the same time adopted relatively lower performance standard levels. On the other hand, the study found a nonsignificant correlation between the state agency capacity and fidelity factors (r = .13 between data tracking capacity and implementation fidelity; r = -.12 between school improvement grants for SINI and implementation fidelity), implying that highstakes accountability policy was not systematically accompanied by capacity-building efforts at the state level. However, the states' activism in building a data tracking system was positively associated with the state agencies' capacity for school support as measured by school improvement grants for SINI (r = .45).
The Level 2 model involves comparing the firstand second-generation accountability states. To address potential selection bias in drawing causal inferences about the impact of NCLB based on this comparison, this study applies inverse probability of treatment weighting (IPTW) and latent variable regression methods. IPTW builds on propensity score matching that employs a predicted probability of group membership-treatment versus control group-based on observed predictors, which may be used for matching or as covariates for quasiexperimental research (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) . IPTW realizes this matching by assigning differential weights to subjects based on the inverse probability of receiving a treatment at a given time conditional on prior outcome history and other covariates (Hirano & Imbens, 2002) . Based on prior research (Carnoy & Loeb, 2002; Lee, 1997) , we identified six covariates (X 1 = % high school graduates, X 2 = % population below poverty, X 3 = % White population, X 4 = % state share of education revenues, X 5 = traditionalistic political culture, X 6 = average SAT scores corrected for % test takers) that were likely to be associated with both policy adoption and achievement outcomes; they were all measured around 1990, that is, prior to the states' pre-NCLB accountability policy implementation period (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) . Then, the treatment variable (z)-dummy variable for the existence of pre-NCLB accountability policy based on the Dee and Jacob (2009) study-was modeled as a function of the covariates (x) with linear and quadratic terms using binomial logistic regression to generate propensity scores for treatment group assignment [χ 2 (11) = 24.04, p < .01 for the omnibus test of model coefficients; Nagelkerke R 2 = .52; classification accuracy rate = 82%]. The results showed that the first-generation accountability states were more likely to have lower high school graduation rates, lower SAT scores, and traditional political culture (e.g., centralized state control of education); despite the statistical insignificance of the percentage poverty and percentage White variables, they were retained in the model based on prior research. With the estimated propensity score (i.e., predicted probability that each state adopts high-stakes accountability before NCLB, conditional on all of the covariates), states were assigned weights to adjust for selection bias.
6 Finally, we fit the HLM model with IPTW weights at the state level to estimate NCLB accountability policy effects.
Preliminary analyses showed that both the capacity and accountability factors are associated with state initial statuses and pre-NCLB growth rates; high-capacity states tend to have a relatively higher initial status of student achievement (in both subjects and grades), whereas highaccountability (particularly high-rigor) states tend to have a relatively lower initial status (in both subjects and grades) or greater pre-NCLB growth (in Grade 4 reading and Grade 8 math). Thus, a latent variable regression method was used to address the effects of initial status and pre-NCLB growth rate on post-NCLB changes (see Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) .
The study has several limitations that warrant caveats and further investigations. First, the state-level aggregate policy measures employed are only proxies for observable state policy activities and responses that may or may not coincide with local policy implementation such as changes in instructional time allocation and classroom practices.
7 Second, it remains controversial whether using the NAEP as opposed to states' own assessment results is a more valid way to measure policy impact on student achievement outcomes under NCLB. We chose not to use state tests as an outcome measure in NCLB evaluations because they are part of the NCLB treatment/intervention. Third, our model tests for changes in both status and growth: Effect on the former suggests immediate temporary gain/ loss in achievement whereas effect on the latter suggests subsequent incremental gain/loss. However, it may not accurately capture delayed policy effects. Fourth, one potential factor that may confound the results of the average achievement and gap trend analysis is change in the identification and exclusion of certain groups of students for NAEP testing, particularly students with learning disabilities (SWD) and English language learners (ELL). Since the exclusion rate of SWD and/or ELL students varied from state to state, future research needs to consider this interstate variation for potentially more valid comparison of the state achievement trends. 8 Finally, because of the shift from voluntary state participation in the NAEP to mandatory with the NCLB legislation, analyses that rely on different sets of states can yield different estimates of the pre-NCLB and post-NCLB trends. A sensitivity analysis that uses only states with enough pre-NCLB data to estimate a trend was conducted to see how much the differential state participation affects results. Specifically, we selected states that participated at least three times before NCLB. 9 We identified 40 states for Grade 4 reading and Grade 8 math, 33 states for Grade 8 reading, and 31 states for Grade 4 math that met this criterion and then conducted separate analyses with those selected states only. The sensitive analysis checked robustness by comparing these limited state sample results with the original 50-state sample results. We found that the magnitudes of coefficients are similar and their significance patterns are almost the same such that the substantive findings and conclusions do not change.
Results

Post-NCLB State Average Achievement Trends
Descriptive analyses of pooled data, state average achievement scale scores from all 50 states over the [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . The random coefficient growth model HLM analysis finds that there were mixed patterns of changes in average achievement for different subjects and grades after NCLB across the states: The overall directions of these changes were positive for math but negative for reading (see fixed effects in Table 1 It needs to be noted that these estimates of post-NCLB changes are above and beyond what one would expect to happen based on a continuation of pre-NCLB trends. Furthermore, both pre-and post-NCLB trends would capture residualized achievement gains or losses unique from changes in student demographics and school resources. Increases in the proportion of minority and poor student populations were consistently associated with decreases in states' average achievement across subjects and grades. The estimated intrastate regression coefficient for the effect of percentage poor students ranges from -.18 to -.24. For example, a 10 percentage point increase of poor students (about one standard deviation of state average poverty rate) is associated with a 2.4 point (.07 σ) loss in Grade 4 state average reading scale scores (10 * b 40 = -2.4). Consistent negative relationships of a similar magnitude are found with percentage Black (b 50 ranging from -.14 to -.25) and percentage Hispanic (b 60 ranging from -.09 to -.16) across grades and subjects.
On the other hand, there were consistently positive effects of increases in teacher resources on student achievement.
11 The coefficient for a teacher salary effect (one unit = $1,000) ranges from .07 to .20. For example, a $7,000 increase in teacher salary (about one standard deviation of state average teacher salary) was associated with a 1.4-point gain (.04 σ) in Grade 4 state average reading scale scores (7 * b 70 = 1.40). At the same time, the coefficient for the pupil-teacher ratio effect ranges from -.13 to -.58, with the exception of a marginally positive effect in eighth-grade math. For example, a threeunit decrease in pupil-teacher ratio (about one standard deviation of state average pupil-teacher ratio) was associated with a 1.74-point gain (.05 σ) of Grade 4 state average reading scale scores (-3 * b 80 = 1.74).
Post-NCLB State Achievement Gap Trends
The results of random coefficient model analyses for achievement gaps are summarized in Table 2 . In reading, there were mixed, although generally negative, patterns in post-NCLB progress toward closing the achievement gaps between racial, socioeconomic, and academic subgroups. For the achievement gaps between racial and socioeconomic subgroups in particular, pre-NCLB progress has either remained the same or slowed down after NCLB. There were no post-NCLB changes seen in either the status or growth rate of the Black-White reading achievement gap in Grades 4 and 8. The same can be said of the Hispanic-White reading gap.
A reversal of earlier progress since 1990 is most evident for the socioeconomic reading achievement gap. Post-NCLB increases in both the status (b 30 = 1.87) and growth rate (b 20 = 0.89) of the nonpoorpoor gap in fourth grade were observed. The total amount of post-NCLB increases by 2009 in the nonpoor-poor gap for fourth-grade reading was 7.21. Although somewhat smaller in magnitude, increases in both status (b 30 = 1.73) and growth rate (b 20 = .47) were also seen for eighth grade. For fourth grade, the increase in gap level was attributable to differential post-NCLB drops for both subgroups wherein poor students dropped more than their nonpoor counterparts. The post-NCLB increase in the growth rate of the socioeconomic reading gap in fourth grade was attributable to a setback experienced by poor students only. For eighth grade, the post-NCLB increase in the level of this socioeconomic reading achievement gap occurred because poor students dropped more than nonpoor students.
Post-NCLB changes to the reading achievement gaps between academic subgroups were mixed; the changes in status evidence setbacks, whereas changes in growth rates suggest progress. We found an increase in the status of the fourth-grade reading achievement gap between the 90th and 10th percentiles (b 30 = 2.20). However, we observed a reduction in the growth rate (b 20 = -1.11) for this gap. In eighth grade, we found an increase in the status (b 30 = 5.05) of the reading achievement gap between the 90th and 10th percentiles. Similar post-NCLB increases to the status of both the fourth-grade (b 30 = 1.19) and eighth-grade (b 30 = 2.73) reading achievement gap between the 75th and 25th percentiles were observed. In contrast, we again found reductions in the growth rate after NCLB in both fourth grade (b 20 = -0.70) and eighth grade (b 20 = -0.33). The 
TABLE 2 Summary Results of Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) Base Model (Random Coefficients Model) for the Trends of State National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) Reading and Math Achievement Gap Trends
Reading Math There was also some indication of progress in narrowing socioeconomic gaps in math after NCLB. For post-NCLB changes in the nonpoorpoor gap in math achievement, we found a reduction in the level of the gap in fourth grade (b 30 = -2.21) and a reduction in both the growth rate (b 20 = -0.49) and status (b 30 = -2.18) in eighth grade. The post-NCLB reduction in the fourth-grade gap level was fueled by positive changes for both groups, with poor students gaining more. The post-NCLB reduction in the gap growth rate in eighth grade was owed to positive post-NCLB growth rate changes for both groups, with relatively faster growth for poor students. The reduction in the status of the poverty gap in eighth-grade math was similarly explained by increases in status for both groups, which favored poor over nonpoor students. The total reduction in the nonpoor-poor gap for eighthgrade math by 2009 was 5.12.
Our analysis of the academic gaps in math largely also suggests favorable changes after NCLB. For progress in closing the gap in math achievement between the 90th and 10th percentiles, our analysis reveals post-NCLB reductions in status in fourth grade (b 30 = -4.29) and in both the status (b 30 = -1.46) and growth rate (b 20 = -.31) in eighth grade. The post-NCLB reduction in the status of the gap in fourth grade was caused by positive changes for both groups, with the 10th percentile gaining more. For eighth grade, the post-NCLB reduction in the academic gap level was fueled by an increase in level for the 10th percentile. The decrease in the growth rate in eighth grade was fueled by positive changes for both groups, with the 10th percentile's relatively faster growth. Total post-NCLB reduction in the 90th-10th percentile gap for eighth-grade math by 2009 was 3.32.
As with overall academic achievement, we also examined the effects of two school resource variables (i.e., teacher salary and pupil-teacher at University at Buffalo Libraries on May 6, 2012 http://eepa.aera.net Downloaded from ratio) on racial/ethnic, socioeconomic, and academic achievement gaps. It is interesting that increases in teacher salary were associated with increases in the magnitude of 18 of the 20 gaps examined. For example, a $1,000 increase in salary was associated with a .24-point increase in the gap between Black and White students in eighth-grade mathematics. The magnitudes of the other significant teacher salary coefficients (b 70 s) ranged from .11 to .56. Subgroup analyses showed that 12 of the 18 teacher salary effects on gaps were driven by a positive relationship between teacher salary and the achievement of only the more advantaged group. The six others were fueled by a positive relationship between teacher salary and the achievement of the advantaged group, on one hand, and a negative relationship between teacher salary and the achievement of the disadvantaged group, on the other hand. These results suggest that an increase in teacher salary (proxy for teacher experience and quality) might have stronger effects for more advantaged highachieving students.
In contrast, increases in pupil-teacher ratio were associated with increases in academic achievement gaps. For example, a one-unit increase in pupil-teacher ratio was associated with a .56-point increase in the achievement gap between the 90th and 10th percentiles in gradeeight reading. The magnitudes of the other pupilteacher ratio coefficients (b 80 s) for the academic gaps ranged from .24 to .90. Increased pupilteacher ratios were usually associated with lower achievement for the more disadvantaged group only. Pupil-teacher ratio also had a similar, positive relationship with the mathematics achievement gap between Hispanic and White students in Grade 4. This effect was seen because a higher pupil-teacher ratio was associated with lower achievement for Hispanic students only. These results suggest that pupil-teacher ratio (proxy for class size) has stronger effects for more disadvantaged low-achieving students (see Finn & Achilles, 1990) .
The negative effect of teacher salary improvement and the positive effect of pupil-teacher ratio reduction on achievement gaps might be related to their different resource allocation patterns between advantaged high-achieving students and disadvantaged low-achieving students. Pupilteacher ratio tends to be lower for low-achieving students, since class size reduction has been mostly targeted to those in compensatory education or special education (Rothstein, 1995) . In contrast, the effects of teacher salary increase, if any, are more likely to accrue to high-achieving students, since the custom of a backloaded teacher salary raise gives larger benefits to veteran teachers (Lankford & Wyckoff, 1997; Monk & Jacobson, 1985) , whereas higher paid teachers with greater experience often transfer to more advantaged and highachieving schools (Roza, 2010) . Uneven effects on the achievement gaps may follow such unequal distributions of teacher compensation and class size.
NCLB and State Policy Effects on Post-NCLB Achievement Trends
Notwithstanding aggregated fixed effects patterns of achievement trends as summarized in the previous sections, the random coefficient model analysis finds that there were significant variations among the states in terms of the nature and extent of post-NCLB changes even after adjusting for the effects of time-varying covariates. Random effects were significant for both the level and growth rate of state average achievement before and after NCLB across subjects and grades; one exception was Grade 4 reading (see random effects in Table 1 ).
To account for those interstate variations in post-NCLB trends, a sequence of three state-level models was applied to each of four achievement outcomes as dependent variables (see Table 3 ). Model 1 does not include any adjustment for covariates at both levels and includes only pre-NCLB accountability as a sole predictor at Level 2. Model 2 adds all other Level 2 predictors with IPTW weights but it does not include teacher salary and pupil-teacher ratio variables at Level 1. Model 3 includes both resource variables at Level 1 to account for changes in test scores attributable to resource changes so that trends are left to pick up the effects of accountability. second-generation states since NCLB. Flipping this interpretation, the "negative" effect of having "pre-NCLB" accountability policy on "post-NCLB" status or growth would signify a "positive" effect of adopting NCLB accountability policy. However, after controlling for pre-NCLB state characteristics, trends, and other covariates including demographic changes, Model 2 results make the effects of pre-NCLB accountability insignificant, except for a consistently significant effect on post-NCLB change to growth in Grade 8 reading (b 21 = -.22). A two standard deviation decrease in the pre-NCLB highstakes accountability (equivalent to a move from first-generation to second-generation status) was associated with a very small gain by 2009 in Grade 8 reading: -2 × (b 31 + 6 b 21 ) = 2.36 (.07 σ). Even so, the validity of this interpretation depends on its implicit assumption that all states, including both first-and second-generation accountability states, implemented NCLB accountability policy equally well. The Model 2 results for most state-level predictors are highly similar to corresponding Model 3 results in all subjects and grades. This suggests that accountability policy did not influence overall school resources (i.e., teacher salary and pupil-teacher ratio) and thus policy effects, if any, are not mediated by those resources that have independent effects on achievement outcomes. As shown in the likelihood ratio test results, Model 2 explains a significant share of the interstate variations in post-NCLB trends, whereas Model 3, with the same set of state policy variables plus school resource variables, explains even more of the variations than Model 2.
The Model 3 results show that states' fidelity and rigor in NCLB implementation have a few positive effects regardless of pre-NCLB accountability status. After controlling for other possible confounders, positive gains were associated with NCLB implementation fidelity (b 22 = .14 for Grade 8 math) as well as the rigor of standards (b 23 = .69 for Grade 8 reading and b 23 = .12 for Grade 4 math). Even those weak positive effects of fidelity and rigor variables are hard to generalize, since they are not observed consistently across grades and subjects. By and large, the state-level regression results reveal only limited potential effects of high-stakes school accountability policy-effects that failed to make either statistically or practically significant differences in post-NCLB trends.
Furthermore, the Model 3 results give only partial support for the hypothesis that states' administrative/financial capacity for district/ school support under NCLB would bring academic improvement (see "data tracking capacity" and "funding capacity for SINI" in Table 3 ). Two standard deviations of an increase in the data tracking capacity variable is associated with a 2-point gain in the status of Grade 8 math achievement (2 * b 34 = 1.98). Significant effects on status but not growth indicate that the effects were immediate but not sustainable. State funding capacity for SINI was not systematically associated with post-NCLB changes in state average achievement. However, additional subgroup and gap analysis showed that funding capacity for SINI was associated with improved post-NCLB gains for only low-achieving students and thus smaller academic gaps between the 75th and 25th percentiles and the 90th and 10th percentiles in math.
Last, the results of HLM latent variable regression in both Models 2 and 3 show the tendency for states that had a relatively lower initial status and/or relatively smaller gains prior to NCLB to experience more immediate gains and/or faster growth after NCLB (see coefficients for pre-NCLB level and pre-NCLB growth in Table 3 ). Because the first-generation accountability states gained faster than their second-generation counterparts during the pre-NCLB period, a reversed pace of growth is likely to occur to those two groups of states by chance regardless of NCLB policy impact. The first-generation states are unlikely to sustain the same rate of growth under NCLB perhaps as a result of diminishing returns to high-stakes accountability policy and thus fading policy impact, whereas the second-generation states are likely to make faster gains than before in spite of their less faithful implementation of NCLB. Without considering this pattern that arose, possibly due to diminishing returns to accountability policy, we might overestimate the impact of NCLB by observing greater gains among the secondgeneration states than the first-generation states.
Summary and Conclusion
This study updates and revisits earlier evaluations of the NCLB policy's impact with regard to progress toward the goal of improving proficiency for all students and narrowing student achievement gaps with NAEP data collected by 2009 in reading and math. It offers new insights for the evaluation of NCLB by differentiating high-stakes school accountability and capacitybuilding policy initiatives among the first-and second-generation accountability states over an extended pre-NCLB/post-NCLB time period. The study is also more methodologically judicious than previous studies by refining the comparative interrupted time-series design through statistical modeling that addresses more potential threats to causal inferences about the policy impact.
By and large, there were highly mixed patterns of post-NCLB changes in terms of improving reading versus math achievement across the nation. The comparison of pre-and post-NCLB reading outcome trends showed that the level of state average achievement as well as the pace of achievement gains have either remained the same or declined after NCLB. In contrast, the earlier progress in math has continued or accelerated with more gains after NCLB than before. However, the magnitude of these cumulative achievement gains or losses in the post-NCLB period (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) was relatively small. Similarly, there were mixed patterns of progress in narrowing achievement gaps in reading versus math. In reading, the states did not narrow achievement gaps since NCLB but instead experienced a setback to the earlier progress. In math, there was some significant progress for narrowing the achievement gaps. Regardless of the subpopulations involved and the grade/subject, however, it is noteworthy that the magnitude of post-NCLB changes in the gaps is not only short of meeting NCLB achievement targets for all students but also particularly insufficient to redress setbacks to the earlier national progress in narrowing racial achievement gaps (see Lee, 2002; Peterson, 2006) .
Were different patterns of post-NCLB academic improvement in reading and math related to NCLB? The high-stakes external accountability policy under NCLB appears to have placed equal or similar priorities on improving both reading and math achievement. However, there were actually more favorable changes in instructional conditions for reading than for math (e.g., considerable investment in an early reading program). A study of changes in instructional time allocation since NCLB also shows that schools allocated relatively more time to reading than to math (CEP, 2007a) . In addition, there was a greater shortage of qualified teachers in math than in reading, particularly within high-minority and high-poverty schools (National Center for Education Statistics [NCES], 2002) . Given these conditions, it is hard to understand why the test results improved in math but not in reading during the NCLB period (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) . This inconsistency begs the question of whether these changes are necessarily attributable to the impact of NCLB.
The findings of our study challenge those of some previous studies. For example, an earlier study by Dee and Jacob (2009) reported significant positive effects of NCLB in math but not in reading based on NAEP data through 2007. In contrast, our study found a significant positive effect only in Grade 8 reading based on NAEP data through 2009. Two possible reasons for the divergence of these findings from those of Dee and Jacob (2009) include our longer NAEP time frame and our additional efforts to consider internal validity threats. It appears that, without adequate statistical control for pre-NCLB state characteristics and achievement trends, one observes more tentative gains among the secondgeneration accountability states (in comparison with the first-generation counterparts) in Grade 4 math and reading during the period of [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . However, those modest post-NCLB gains became even smaller and insignificant once we took into account differences in the earlier results and diminishing returns to accountability policy.
Furthermore, cross-state variations in the fidelity of NCLB policy implementation and the rigor of performance standards were not systematically associated with post-NCLB academic improvement and achievement gap patterns. If the NCLB policy were to be ascribed as a cause for any observed post-NCLB change in achievement gaps, one might expect that these predictors tied to the policy itself would be consistently related to the outcomes. Although there was limited evidence for positive effects of high-stakes accountability, this was often restricted to immediate gains right after NCLB without sustainable effects on further growth. The study also found limited evidence for positive effects of state agency capacity for district/school support, particularly building achievement data tracking systems and funding schools in need of improvement.
On the other hand, our study found more consistent positive effects of statewide educational resources, independent of accountability policy, on achievement gains. The trends of states' educational resources as measured by pupilteacher ratio and teacher salary were not related to state activism in high-stakes accountability policy before or after NCLB. Although states' targeted financial and technical support for schools identified as needing improvement under NCLB might be potentially cost-effective, this approach shortchanges the long-term need for statewide educational investment in school/ classroom level infrastructures such as more qualified teachers and smaller classes. The study also demonstrates that the statewide improvement of educational resources was associated with either the widening or narrowing of achievement gaps. Uneven effects of teacher salary and pupilteacher ratio on the achievement of racial, socioeconomic, and academic subgroups suggest that teacher resources may work to either increase or decrease achievement gaps.
Given mixed evidence on the mid-course efficacy of NCLB, this study has implications for subsequent research conducted to track future policy changes and outcomes across different groups of states (i.e., the first-and secondgeneration accountability states) and to explain complex patterns of post-NCLB academic progress in different subjects and varied results for different types of achievement gaps. Although the ultimate impact of NCLB in its current form remains uncertain and this study cannot pinpoint specific directions of policy changes in anticipation of NCLB reauthorization, it is important to address the limits of external test-driven accountability policy in terms of building longterm instructional capacity and producing sustainable academic gains across the system. Although the study does not find a tradeoff between the goals of improving average achievement and narrowing achievement gaps, it is a tall order for a federal educational policy to promote both academic excellence and equity.
12 strategies to raise awareness of available data. The number of elements and actions met in each state (1 = yes, 0 = no) is summed across 20 items. The alpha reliability coefficient for the index is .64. State NAEP 1990 NAEP -2009 For states (N = 30) with a pre-NCLB high-stakes school accountability policy (T = 1), the greater the chance of pre-NCLB treatment group assignment (or presumably post-NCLB control group) conditional on the covariates [p(T = 1|X)], the smaller the weight it gets for regression analysis. For states (N = 20) without a pre-NCLB highstakes school accountability policy (T = 0), the greater the chance of pre-NCLB control group assignment (or presumably post-NCLB treatment group) given covariates [p(T = 0|X)], the smaller the weight. Regression analysis based on this weighted sample is expected to produce unbiased estimates of the treatment effect, independent of observed differences in the initial treatment and control groups (i.e., first-and second-generation accountability states). Before applying the IPTW method for the estimation of NCLB policy effects, we used a propensity score stratification method to ensure that treatment and control group members are balanced on their propensity score and key covariates of selection into the treatment.
7. The current NAEP collects very limited types and amounts of information on classroom practices, and the available teacher survey variables are hardly consistent between different rounds, before and after NCLB. Our use of states as the unit of analysis also raises concerns about aggregation bias at the state level as well as concerns about a limited sample size and statistical power.
8. On one hand, as a result of demographic changes, the national average identification rate of SWD and/or ELL students in NAEP has increased over the past 15 years and thus tends to be higher for the post-NCLB period than for the pre-NCLB period. On the other hand, as a result of accommodation permitted since 1996 in math and since 1998 in reading, the national average exclusion rate of SWD and/or ELL students in NAEP has decreased over time and thus tends to be somewhat lower for the post-NCLB period than for the pre-NCLB period.
9. This means that states should have either no missing or only one missing NAEP data point during the pre-NCLB period (i.e., minimum 3 out of 4 times for both Grade 4 reading and Grade 8 math, 3 out of 3 times for Grade 4 math). The maximum number of times is only 2 for grade 8 reading, so only states with a minimum 2 times are included.
10. We also checked the correlation between pre-NCLB accountability and the number of times that states participated in the NAEP during the 1990-2009 period for each subject and grade. The results showed no indications of correlations at all (r = -.04 for Grade 4 reading, r = .18 for Grade 8 reading, r = .02 for Grade 4 math, r = .11 for Grade 8 math). The same patterns were found for correlations with the NCLB implementation fidelity variable.
11. The significance and strength of these intrastate relationships between time-varying measures of school resources and student achievement in this study converge with prior meta-analysis research. Greenwald, Hedges, and Laine (1996) reported an average effect size of approximately .21 SD achievement gain per $7,000 increase for teacher salary and a .03 SD achievement gain per 3 student decrease in pupil-teacher ratio.
12. Socioeconomic changes and other state policies such as welfare might also contribute to student achievement gap trends (see Lee, 2002; Miller & Zhang, 2009) . It calls for more comprehensive policy strategies to address factors beyond schools.
